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Introduction: I.P.P. and traceability codes
Consider the set of n-words over an alphabet Q of size q: Let dða; bÞ denote the Hamming distance and sða; bÞ ¼ n À dða; bÞ denote the number of agreements between the vectors a and b: A subset C of Q n is called a code. Let d ¼ dðCÞ be the distance of C; i.e., the minimum distance between distinct codewords. We write Cðn; M; dÞ to denote a code of length n; size M; and distance d; and Cðn; MÞ if the value of the distance is of no importance. By R ¼ RðCÞ we denote the code rate R ¼ ð1=nÞ log q M:
Finally, if Q forms a finite field, we use the notation C½n; k; d for a linear code of length n; dimension k and distance d (occasionally omitting the distance).
For a subset X ¼ fx 1 ; y; x t gCQ n define its envelope eðXÞ by eðXÞ ¼ fxAQ n : x i Afx 1 i ; y; x t i g; i ¼ 1; y; ng: Elements of the envelope eðXÞ will be called descendants of X: If yAeðXÞ; we will call any of the elements of X parents of y:
The union of the envelopes of all the subsets of C of size pt is called the t-envelope of the code The parent-descendant relation gives rise to several classes of codes that have recently gained considerable attention in the literature.
Definition. An ðn; MÞ code C has the t-identifying parent property if for any yAE t ðCÞ; P C ðyÞ :¼ \ XCC yAeðXÞ; jXjpt
Xa|: ð1Þ
For brevity we call such codes t-i.p.p. codes. Informally, given a t-i.p.p. code it is possible for every vector yAE t ðCÞ to identify with certainty at least one of its parents.
t-i.p.p. codes and codes for related cryptographic problems received considerable attention in the recent years [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 10 ] (paper [10] introduced i.p.p. codes for the case t ¼ 2), [13, 14] .
For qX3; existence of 2-i.p.p. codes with rate R bounded away from 0 for n-N was proved in [10] . For the case of general t; existence of i.p.p. codes of nonzero rate for any qXt þ 1 was first proved in [4] . These papers also provided a characterization of 2-and 3-i.p.p. codes, respectively.
Let R q ðtÞ denote the maximum asymptotically attainable rate of q-ary t-i.p.p. codes:
RðCÞ:
The following results are known about R q ðtÞ:
This result was proved by introducing ðt; uÞ hashing codes (functions) [4] and using the probabilistic method to derive an existence bound on their number. In particular, for t ¼ 2 Theorem 1.1 coincides with an earlier result of Hollmann et al. [10] . Generally, we see that for t-i.p.p. codes to exist it is sufficient that tpq À 1: This is also a necessary condition because for qpt there are only trivial identifying codes: the maximal size of a t-i.p.p. code, tXq; is M ¼ t:
The probabilistic argument for ðt; uÞ hashing was refined in [1] resulting in the following estimate which improves the result of Theorem 1.1 for q ¼ t þ 1 and all t except t ¼ 2; 3:
The procedure of finding a codeword x in an i.p.p. code C which necessarily is a parent of a given word y; i.e., xAP C ðyÞ; is called identification (or tracing traitors) [7] . It is clear that for any yAE t ðCÞ; we can identify at least one of its parents by examining all the ð M t Þ subsets of C of size t: For codes of large size this requires prohibitively long computation. Therefore, the following open problem was raised in [13] 
i.e., if c is a nearest (in C) codevector to y then it is also one of its parents. Hence, in a traceability code a parent of a given word yAE t ðCÞ can be identified by finding a closest codeword to y: This requires examining at most M codewords; thus, identification for traceability codes can be performed faster than for i.p.p. codes in general.
One simple sufficient condition for a code to possess the t-traceability property was given in [7] . Proposition 1.3 (Chor et al. [7] ). Let C be a q-ary code with minimum code distance d; where d4nð1 À 1=t 2 Þ for some t40: Then C is a t-traceability code. In particular, for any vector yAE t ðCÞ there exists a vector xAS C ðyÞ such that sðy; xÞXn=t; any such vector also satisfies xAP C ðyÞ:
Proof. Let X ¼ fx 1 ; y; x t gCC be a t-coalition and let yAeðXÞ: By the definition of the envelope, for some xAX; sðx; yÞXn=t:
On the other hand, for any codevector w outside X;
This proposition together with some known results on error-correcting codes leads to a more accurate formulation of the above problem. Namely, it is clear that a solution to it can be obtained if we can construct a sequence of t-traceability codes equipped with an efficient algorithm of finding a nearest codeword to a vector yAQ n (hence, in particular, to a vector yAE t ðCÞ). By Proposition 1.3 such a sequence can be obtained from any family of error-correcting codes with large minimum distance. A natural candidate is a family of q-ary ½N; RN; dN linear algebraic-geometric (AG) codes whose relative distance d can be made arbitrarily close to one for sufficiently large q [15] . Moreover, a polynomial-time list decoding algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan [9] enables us to find a nearest codeword x to a given point y provided that sðy; xÞXN
Choosing d sufficiently close to 1; we obtain a sequence of efficient t-i.p.p. codes with the traceability property. 3 However, to construct codes of large size following this approach, one has to employ codes over an alphabet of a fairly large size. Namely, recall that by the Plotkin upper bound (see [15] ) for any q-ary ðn; MÞ code with distance d its cardinality
Substituting d4nð1 À 1=t 2 Þ; we see that for qot 2 the denominator is a positive integer, and therefore, the size of the code Mpqn: Thus, for qot 2 it is not possible to construct codes whose rate R remains bounded away from zero as n grows. Therefore, the nontrivial part of the above problem can be formulated as follows:
For t 2 XqXt þ 1 construct a sequence of q-ary t-i.p.p. codes with rate R40 and an identification algorithm of complexity polynomial in the code length n:
A solution to this problem is given in this paper. Moreover, the family of codes which we present is also polynomial-time constructible, and affords a polynomial-time algorithm of assigning fingerprints to registered users. We will call a code family with these properties a polynomial-complexity code family. Our main result is given by the following theorem. Theorem 1.4. For any qXt þ 1 and any rate 0pRo 1 t 2 R q ðtÞ; there exists a polynomial-complexity family of q-ary ðn; q Rn Þ t-i.p.p. code.
Proof: a polynomial-complexity family of t-i.p.p. codes
Now we will construct a family of q-ary codes Cðn; MÞ by concatenating a q-ary ti.p.p. code Vðm; q mRðVÞ Þ and a Q-ary linear ½N; K; D code W; Q ¼ q mRðVÞ : The parameters of the code C are: length mN; rate RðCÞ ¼ RðVÞRðWÞ: By carefully choosing the parameters of the constituent codes we will ensure that RðCÞXconst40 for an infinite sequence of values of the code length. The value of q is fixed, independent of the code length. Finally, t can be any number such that t þ 1pq:
First, we recall the concatenated construction. There are two codes: the inner q-ary ðm; MÞ code V and the outer Q-ary ½N; K code W; where QpM ¼ q mRðVÞ : For the reasons which will become clear later we take Q to be the largest even power of a prime less than or equal to q mRðVÞ : Let us fix an arbitrary injective mapping f from which is a word of the concatenated code C: It is convenient to have in mind a representation of this codeword as a matrix with N columns and m rows. Clearly, C is an ðn; Q K Þ code with n ¼ mN; Q K Eq mNRðVÞRðWÞ and hence of rate RERðVÞRðWÞ:
Let tpq À 1 be fixed. V is taken to be a t-i.p.p. ðm; q mRðVÞ Þ code whose existence is proved in Theorems 1.1 and 1.2. We also take W to be a Q-ary one-point AG code with the parameters ½N; K ¼ RðWÞN; D ¼ dN: To obtain as high rate RðCÞ as possible, we take AG codes from asymptotically maximal curves so that their parameters for large N attain the bound [15] 
Let yAE t ðCÞ be an n-word, which is represented as an ðm Â NÞ matrix over F q : Let y 1 ; y; y N denote the columns of y; where y i AE t ðVÞ; i ¼ 1; y; m: A column y i can be ''decoded'' with the code V; where by decoding we mean finding a parent of y i in V: Our decoding algorithm of the code C is a two-stage procedure which in the initial stage employs N parallel, independent decodings of the columns in y with the code V; and uses the Guruswami-Sudan (GS) algorithm [9] in the second stage to find a codeword from P C ðyÞ:
Guruswami-Sudan decoding [9] . Let W be a Q-ary Reed-Solomon or an (onepoint) AG code with the parameters ½N; RN; dN: Then for any vector zAF 
by an appropriate modification (and simplification) of the original GS algorithm. We will call this reduced decoding procedure the reduced GS algorithm.
Relying on t-i.p.p. codes and GS decoding, we will show that under certain conditions, the concatenated code C admits an efficient identification algorithm described as follows.
Identification Algorithm for the code C: * Outer decoding: Decode z with the code W using the reduced GS algorithm producing the list Y z ðN=tÞ: * Output: Take an arbitrary vector w from the list Y z ðN=tÞ (we will show that the list is not empty). Encode w with the map f as described in the beginning of this section to obtain a vector xAC: Output x: Proposition 2.1. Consider a code Cðn; q Rn Þ constructed by concatenating a q-ary ti.p.p. ðm; q mRðVÞ Þ code V and a Q-ary ½N; RðWÞN; dN code W; d41 À 1=t 2 : The code C is t-i.p.p., and for every yAE t ðCÞ the Identification Algorithm will output a vector xAP C ðyÞ:
Proof. Let X ¼ fx 1 ; y; x t gCC be the coalition which generated y; i.e., yAeðXÞ: Denote by w 1 ; y; w t the codewords of W that correspond to x 1 ; y; x t ; respectively.
Denote by x i;j AV the ith column of the codeword x j ; 1pjpt: Then This proves that the Algorithm always produces a vector in P C ðyÞ; and therefore also the fact that C is t-i.p.p. &
The rate of the concatenated code C equals RðCÞ ¼ m À1 ðlog q QÞRðWÞ ¼
RðVÞRðWÞ:
If the inner and outer codes are chosen as described, then it is possible to construct a code whose rate RðCÞ is
where both e 1 and
tend to zero when m tends to infinity, and e 2 tends to zero when N grows. Next, given the value of RðCÞ ¼ R we choose the length m of the inner code V sufficiently large (but fixed) so that It remains to prove the claims about the complexity of the codes C: The construction, encoding, and decoding of the code V whose length is fixed, are of constant complexity. Therefore, the construction and the encoding complexity of the codes C up to a constant factor are equal to the construction (resp., encoding) complexity of the sequence of AG codes, which is known to be polynomial (in fact, a very recent result of Shum et al. [11] provides for them a construction algorithm of low complexity ðN log Q NÞ 3 ). The complexity of identification is governed by the decoding complexity of the GS algorithm which is known to be polynomial [9] . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.4.
Tracing traitors
This section is devoted to an application of the above result to the ''tracing traitors problem'' [7, 8] . Following these papers, we give a short description of how i.p.p. codes fit into a broader context of data distribution schemes that have to deal with pirate decoders. A more complete description is given in the introductory part of the paper [8] .
Informally speaking, a traitor tracing scheme ''helps trace the source of leaks when sensitive or proprietary data is made available to a large set of parties'' [8] . More precisely, information is distributed in an encrypted form over a public channel and ''any captured pirate decoder (which decrypts with success probability which is better than the probability of breaking the encryption scheme that is used) will correctly identify a traitor and will protect the innocent user if up to t traitors collude and combine their keys'' [8] .
Denote by M the number of users of the system. The information can be decrypted using a secret key s which is transmitted over the same channel in an encrypted form. For encryption of the vector s the vectors s 1 ; y; s nÀ1 are chosen randomly by the distributor, and the vector s n is determined by the following condition: s ¼ P n i¼1 s i ðmod 2Þ: Then the vectors s i ; i ¼ 1; y; n are encrypted in an enabling block (which is sent along with the encrypted information through the channel) in such a way that registered users can access them using their personal keys k j ; j ¼ 1; y; M; where k j ¼ ðk
The personal keys of the users are kept secret and known only to the distributor. The jth user gets an access to the enabling block and uses the ith segment k j i of the key k j to decipher s i : Finally, the user recovers the secret key since s ¼ P n i¼1 s i ðmod 2Þ: It is convenient to think of this procedure as applying decoder to the enabling block and obtaining s as a result.
A strategy of the coalition of traitors can be to produce a pirate decoder relying on the knowledge of all their personal keys in an attempt to hide their identities. The task of the distributor is to design these keys in such a way that as long as the size of the coalition of traitors does not exceed a certain value t; it is always possible to retrieve at least one member of the coalition.
Let us enumerate the segments k j i (for a given i) by elements of some finite alphabet Q of size q: For every personal key k j ¼ ðk In order to create a working pirate decoder the coalition should provide it with some key k ¼ k 1 ; y; k n with no position i left blank (otherwise the decoder cannot recover the corresponding s i and hence, s). Recall that despite the code C being public, the members of the coalition of users j 1 ; y; j t know only their own keys k j i : Therefore, every key segment k i in the pirate decoder should be contained in the set fk Thus, to construct an open t-resilient traceability scheme it is sufficient to construct a t-i.p.p. code over an alphabet of a suitably chosen size q: Traceability schemes are characterized by the key length n and the length r ¼ nq of the enabling block (and, generally, the number of decryptions performed by a user, although in our context it always equals n). Such schemes are optimized to achieve small values of n and r as functions of the number of users M:
The paper [8] presents two open fully t-resilient tracing traitor schemes, i.e. schemes that enable the distributor to locate with certainty at least one traitor (and a few more schemes that allow for a nonzero probability of misidentification). The approach to traitor tracing described above corresponds to the first of these two schemes (the second scheme is a bit more complicated and does not corresponds directly to i.p.p. codes)
The parameters of the traitor tracing scheme in [8] are obtained by an application of the probabilistic method. In our notation they are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Chor et al. [8] ). There exists an open t-traceability scheme with n ¼ 4t 2 ln M and q ¼ 2t 2 : Proposition 1.3 together with a relation to i.p.p. codes outlined above implies that any code with a large minimum Hamming distance defines a traceability scheme. Therefore, it makes sense to compare the existence result of Theorem 3.1 to the parameters of the scheme obtained by choosing a code with minimum distance at least nð1 À 1=t 2 Þ whose rate attains the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. In this way we obtain a t-traceability scheme with q ¼ 2t 2 and n ¼ 2t 2 ln M=ð2 ln 2 À 1Þ; which is only by a factor ð4 ln 2 À 2Þ À1 E1:29 inferior to Theorem 3.1. We will use t-i.p.p. codes to present constructive alternatives to the existence results just cited.
In coding terms the problem can be formulated as follows: given t and M construct a q-ary t-i.p.p. code of size M so that the length n and the value r ¼ qn are as small as possible. One obvious avenue to follow is again to take a code with a stronger property, a t-traceability code. For instance, let us take Q-ary AG codes with relative distance d41 À 1=t 2 assuming that for large length N the code parameters attain bound (3). For Q ¼ ð2t 2 Þ 2 we obtain
Omitting small terms, we obtain the following rate: R ¼ 1=ð2t 2 Þ; or ln M ¼ lnðQ nR Þ ¼ n t 2 ln 2t 2 :
Therefore, n ¼ t 2 ln M=ln 2t 2 ; and the length of the enabling block equals r ¼ 4t 6 ðln MÞ=ðln 2t 2 Þ:
There is a constructive t-traceability scheme with n ¼ t 2 ln M=ln 2t 2 and r ¼ 4t 6 ln M=ln 2t 2 and with an identification algorithm of complexity polynomial in n:
The comparison of the parameters of this scheme with Theorem 3.1 shows that from AG traceability codes we obtain a shorter key length but a longer enabling block. Recall that Theorem 3.1 is only an existence result. The parameters of constructive schemes cited in [8] are n ¼ Oðt 6 ln MÞ; r ¼ Oðt 8 ln MÞ; so Proposition 3.2 gives a substantial improvement of that result.
that to find z i we first find a t-subset of vectors of the inner code (or of elements of the field) that supposedly forms the coalition. This t-subset may contain more information about the parents of y than just one element. The purpose of weighted decoding is to make use of just this information. In other words, instead of decoding from one vector z we attempt to decode from a subset of vectors of ðF Q Þ N obtained by taking a product of the N t-subsets that correspond to the coordinates i ¼ 1; y; N: While in the problem of digital fingerprinting the use of weighted decoding yields an improvement in the rate and error bounds of the codes constructed, it does not seem to improve over hard decision decoding in the problem of identification with i.p.p. codes.
